In this paper we study the feasibility of the European EU2020 goal of increasing the number of higher education graduates, considering large differences in incentives and funding schemes between countries in Europe. We conduct an efficiency analysis on 13 Dutch and 58 Italian public universities. Our findings show that the relative efficiency of Italian and Dutch universities is strongly influenced by the policy perspective adopted. If the goal is to realize the European goals and minimise resources employed for obtaining a high number of graduates, Dutch universities turn out to be more efficient. However, Italian universities are much more efficient if the priority is to minimize the costs for a given level of activity, such as number of students. The main policy consequence of our findings is that it will be hard to realise European goals if not all countries have incentive scheme that are in line with these goals.
Introduction
Higher education is deemed a very important matter in international politics, and so it is for Europe as well. Europe stresses the importance of higher education (HE) in its EU2020 targets, which state that there should be a high share of highly educated people in Europe by 2020, as well as an increase in innovation, which is fostered by universities' research, among others (Heuse & Zimmer, 2011) . All EU member states are expected to contribute to the EU2020 targets, and in order to verify the advancements in this respect, the performance of HE institutions in individual countries is monitored closely, for which performance indicators are used.
The use of performance indicators (PIs) or other similar instruments to evaluate the results obtained by public organizations is becoming a common practice to stimulate the improvement of public services, and to increase transparency and accountability towards relevant stakeholders (citizens, government, etc. 1 ). This evolution is one of the key elements of that set of reforms and changes promoted by the New Public Management (NPM) movement (Pollitt & Bouckaert, 2004) , which suggests -together with other tools -the use of performance standard setting and performance-based budgeting, the latter defined as the model to allocate public funds to the organizations on the basis of their performances.
For higher education, the governments in many European countries developed performance-based models to allocate recurrent public funds to universities (Jongbloed & Vossensteyn, 2001) , by using formulas and several PIs for this 1 However, the use of these techniques to assess the performance of public organizations is not exempted from critics. For instance, Courty et al. (2005) listed the main theoretical and practical challenges that policy makers must address when defining standards (and indicators) within Performance Management System, and after studied a case study of some US federal programs, they conclude that: "(the research) confirms both the potential of these systems to be effectively managed to promote performance improvements, and the limitations of these systems' design (…)" (p.343). purpose 2 . The problem in an international context such as Europe is that the performance-based models are not the same across countries, which might hamper the common European goal to increase the number of higher education graduates. It is possible to classify the funding models adopted in HE systems of European countries according to their performance-based orientation. In some countries, like Spain, Italy, UK and France, the funds each university receives are based on the number of students or other input measures, whereas in some other countries (the Netherlands, Denmark, Finland, etc.) the model is much more performance-oriented, and considers indicators like the number of diplomas, credits or graduates (Jongbloed, 2008) . In the light of this, the question arises whether more European regulation towards countries'
performance-evaluation policies is necessary in order to reach the EU2020 targets.
Therefore, the main research question discussed in the paper at hand is the following: "How do the estimated (relative) performances of public universities from countries with different performance based budget systems vary, and how does this relate to achieving the EU2020 HE targets"?
The main contribution of this paper to policymakers is our result about the performance of universities, which shows that systems with very different incentives (i.e. different performance-based models) lead to very different performances, indicating that the performance of universities can be regulated based on incentive schemes, if desirable. It also indicates that incentives created by national funding policies do not always coincide with European common goals. We make this claim by studying a country that has adopted performance oriented incentives through the 2 For information about the characteristics of this phenomenon in the US, see Dougherty et al., 2010. funding scheme, namely the Netherlands, and a country that has totally different incentives, namely Italy for the student-number-oriented group of countries.
In our analysis, we measure performance by using efficiency analysis. In academic research, comparisons between universities have been promoted and realised very cautiously, given the methodological challenges posed by this task (i.e. HE system's internal differentiation). A stream of the literature suggested using efficiency analyses for the comparative purpose (a summary is realised by Johnes, 2004) : in the light of this approach, it is particularly relevant to pay attention to the relationships between inputs and outputs of the HE institutes, more than to their overall/absolute performance. Indeed, in efficiency analyses, institutes are compared to the best-practice units, based on their ability of maximising the outputs given the available inputs, or conversely reducing the inputs employed to obtain a given level of output. This way of conducting empirical analyses is related to the classical finance problem of public spending efficiency (Afonso et al., 2005) ; also, the efficiency approach is of particular interest in this precise historical moment, given the public finances' restrictions due to the persistence of the global financial crisis. Moreover, the academic literature on public sector's performance suggests that the notion of efficiency is adequate for measuring public organizations' performance, more than (simple) indicators of output produced. Pestieau (2009) However, the attempt of comparing HE institutes in more than one country is subjected to some well-known problems and challenges. The main issues are related to (i) the difficulty of comparing datasets from different sources (i.e. statistical offices of different countries) and (ii) the heterogeneity of higher education systems' structure. In this respect, the present paper can further enlarge the literature, as we discuss another source of concerns, which are the different performance incentives that HE institutions have in different countries within Europe. It is likely that these differences are reflected in different budget allocation schemes. The vast literature on performance budgeting, in this perspective, highlighted that public organizations tend to respond to specific incentives provided through the use of funding models (Helmuth, 2010) . These funding models are most likely developed based on different policy priorities and the idea of a socially optimal investment in higher education, which both differ among countries. This is another issue which poses challenges to comparing the performance of institutions in different countries. All these three potential issues are specifically taken into account in our paper.
In the present paper we analyse longitudinal data of our two example countries for the two different performance based models. We have data on all 13 Dutch and 58 and incentives, which adds to the more traditional issues related to data comparability.
The remainder of the paper is organised as follows: in section 2, we present the theoretical framework. Section 3 provides some information about the HE institutional setting in the Netherlands and Italy, and section 4 describes the methodology and data. In section 5 we present the results and in section 6, we conclude and discuss the policy and managerial implications of this paper.
Theoretical Framework
The economic theory considers public universities as complex organizations, which respond to incentives in ways that are related to their own objectives (i.e. reputation) and activities (i.e. teaching and research). Public management theory adopts a similar perspective, when assuming that when policy makers actively promote their own objectives, for instance through the models for allocating public budgets to individuals or organizations, the latter react by focusing on activities/outputs which are rewarded by funding formulas, especially when considering the financial rewards as supportive (Frey & Jegen, 2001 ).
Public universities in Europe receive a considerable amount of public money, and public funding is still their main financial source (OECD, 2011) . In this perspective, it is likely that the HE funding mechanism adopted by the government of a country has an impact on the universities' activities and performance. A stream of the literature is devoted specifically to this point, in other words, to analyse the relationship between public funding systems (incentives) and universities' behaviours. Beath et al. (2005) illustrate how funding formulas can influence the decision of universities in concentrating more on teaching or research; they show that changing the weights of funding parameters leads to different "cultures", which give more relative importance to one of the universities' core activities than to the other. The authors explicitly acknowledge that assumptions about the prevailing "culture" are a key aspect for any cross-country comparison. This work strongly relies upon the Del Rey (2001) model of universities' behaviour; the author makes an assumption about the institutions' objective, the maximization of reputation and/or quality, also including an exogenous influence of the public funding system. Gautier & Wauthy (2007) outline a similar framework, in which the relevant dimension is "internal" (the incentive system to which individual academics respond). Their model shows that heterogeneous preferences about teaching and research can be accommodated into a single rewarding scheme. Their analysis underlines the importance of the ability to modify the behaviour of academic agents with incentive schemes. It is possible to make the agents more focused on improving performances; the key requirement is that the rewarding scheme explicitly provides incentives to performance (performance-based mechanisms). Johnes (2007) analyses the impact of different funding formulas on English universities' behaviour. More specifically, his paper separates the concepts of costs and efficiency, showing that a formula actually could take into account differentials, which are related to universities' activities (costs), and others that are related to institutional ability to make the most with the available money (efficiency). The author argues that the agency in charge of funding universities in England basically uses a formula rewarding the number of students recruited; and a desirable adjustment of the formula is increasing flexibility for allowing different cost structures of universities.
Overall, this literature suggests that universities' activities are indeed very much influenced by the funding scheme adopted by the government in their country.
In the light of such dependence, the performances obtained by universities must be interpreted according to the different economic incentives they are subjected to.
However, when countries commit themselves to European goals, these goals might conflict with the incentives that flow from the national funding scheme.
National uniform funding schemes tend to provide the same incentives for all universities in the country, but this does not hold for universities located in different countries, which might still all be part of Europe. This is due to the fact that each national government can have its own idea of the "socially optimal" investment in public higher education; for instance, some countries can consider it more important to increase the number of people with a tertiary education degree (graduation rates), while others can target the accessibility for students from lower socioeconomic backgrounds (equality of opportunities), and others being interested in maximizing the number of students of each age cohort entering higher education overall (entry rates). From these potentially heterogeneous objectives, differences stem in terms of incentives set through policy-making. The present paper empirically shows that a common European goal with respect to higher education is much harder to realise when countries have different incentive schemes, compared with a situation in which incentives are harmonised as part of the common European policy. To do so, we compare the performances (efficiency) of universities in a cross-country approach, taking into account these differences in incentives. The main theoretical argument is that such exercise will most likely lead to confounding results if failing to properly consider differences in underlying objectives/incentives. Facing this challenge, we focus on universities operating in two different European countries ( , and dependent on the specific parameters (objectives) included in the funding formulas. At the same time, it can be the case that each public university, in each country, is more/less efficient in its operations, so that the observed performance level can be higher/lower when compared to the other universities operating in the
. Indeed, the literature shows that public organizations could be more or less efficient due to their management practices (Andrews, et al., 2012) . Thus, we analyse efficiency differentials between universities in two countries, assuming that:
• part of the differences in efficiency is related to different managerial efficiency (within-country variation);
• another part of the differences between universities is due to different policy landscapes (i.e. national budgetary rules), which provide different incentives to respond to (between-countries variation).
For this reason, we empirically estimate efficiency scores for the public universities in the two countries, by distinguishing two models, which represent different policy views and incentives to which the institutions are subjected. Even though in both countries under scrutiny the government adopts a formula-based budgetary scheme for funding public universities, in one country (Italy) universities receive money according to their dimension/activity and inputs, (measured mainly through the number of students), while in the other country (the Netherlands) the funding formula explicitly targets the output level, as measured through the number of graduates. It is important to note that the country with incentives related to increasing the number of graduates (the Netherlands) is more in line with the pursuing of EU2020 targets. At the same time, however, the analysis presented in this paper considers not only the graduation rate as a target (as EU2020 does), but also the "cost" for obtaining this result (cost-efficiency perspective).
In the light of our framework, we derive the following hypotheses: With the aim of supporting the hypotheses, the next section is dedicated to illustrate the main features of the HE systems of the two countries used for the empirical case study in this paper (the Netherlands and Italy).
Institutional setting in Italy and the Netherlands
Dutch higher education consists of two parts: university education on the one hand and higher professional education on the other hand. Higher professional education schools (HBO-schools) prepare students for professional practice and usually offer a four-year bachelor program. Universities mainly offer a three-year bachelor program and a one-or two-year master program. Apart from that, universities devote a large share of their time and funds to research, contrary to higher professional education schools. In this paper, we only consider the 13 public universities in the Netherlands 4 .
These 13 universities are rather homogeneous and offer very comparable quality and choice with respect to programs. Most universities offer all kinds of disciplines, whereas a few focus on technical disciplines and one is mainly an agricultural university. Also with respect to research the universities are similar in quality and quantity.
After the Bologna process, the bachelor master curriculum was introduced Although the Dutch university system does not have a specific selection system for new students, apart from the prerequisite of finishing pre-university secondary education and for some studies graduation in some particular subjects, many universities have a so called binding study advice after the first year, which only allows a student to continue if he/she obtained a certain amount of credits during the first year. This system ensures the early exit of students, which are very unlikely to 4 The choice of focusing exclusively on universities is due to the necessity of comparing performances between the Netherlands and Italy. Indeed, as Italy has not a two-tiers system (academic and vocational), all the HE institutions are formally universities; as a consequence, for pursuing the comparability objective, we were forced to leaving HBOs out of the analysis.
obtain a diploma in the end. This saves money but also ensures better statistics with respect to the ratio of new entrants compared to the number of diplomas. Figure 1 shows that the share of graduates on the total number of students enrolled is higher than 25% in 2009. Considering that most studies take four years (three years bachelor and one year master), this is a pretty good statistic. The binding study advice possible has a role in this as well. Italy has one of the largest higher education systems in Europe, but at the same time it has been considered as one of the most inefficient and ineffective (Lambert & Butler, 2006 private. This paper focuses only on the public universities. The system is affected by well-known problems, among which high drop-out rates is the most relevant.
According In Italy, there is not a specific recurrent fund for research. Universities receive FFO as a unique block grant and can use it for both teaching and research activities.
In general, this fund reflects historical costs and the "size" of universities -as measured by professors and students; as a consequence, there is not a specific incentive provided by the Ministry through formula funding for research. Additional research funding is collected by participating in tenders, as well as realising applied research commissioned by third parties.
<Figure 2> around here Given the two different landscapes, it is likely that the relative performance (efficiency) of Italian and Dutch universities is strongly influenced by the policy perspective adopted in the empirical analysis. According to the theoretical framework, the assumption in the present paper is that Dutch universities will perform more in line with the EU2020 goals and will try to minimise "cost per graduate", since their funding system is mainly based on the number of graduates 6 . On the other hand, universities in Italy are most likely more focused on minimising "cost per student", as their (public) funding system is based on the number of students. In the next section,
we describe how we put in practice this intuition empirically, and how we used the empirical analysis to validate our theoretical hypothesis.
Methodology and Data

Methodology
In this paper, we analyse higher educational institutions which yearly receive a (public) budget from the government and receive research grants (depending on how successful they are to apply for grants), in order to perform their teaching and research activities, which in turn lead to teaching and research outputs. The budget received from the government is only related to teaching activities, whereas the research grants are usually not sufficient to cover all research activities. Hence, we assume that universities try to minimize their costs in order to produce as much output as possible, so they can benefit the most from the finances they receive (and can also cross-subsidize research). The conversion from inputs (costs, expenditures) into outputs (research and teaching) is usually analysed by an efficiency framework.
Efficiency is defined as the ratio between (weighted) outputs and (weighted) inputs;
weights are used to consider many inputs and outputs simultaneously.
In this paper, we rely upon the idea of technical (or productive) efficiency (Farrell, 1957) , meaning the ability of a university to transform inputs into outputs.
Efficient universities are those for which the ratio between outputs and inputs is highest -in other words, they produce the maximum level of output given the available inputs. Efficient universities are then used as a "benchmark" to compare other universities with; the latter are defined as "inefficient" and the degree of inefficiency is calculated as a distance from "best-practice" institutions. are not operating at minimum costs. The distance between a university's location and the frontier is the decrease in costs that is still possible for this university, given the current output.
In our Translog function we do not only include inputs and outputs, but also country and year dummies, in order to correct for heterogeneity between countries and differences between years. For the estimation of the Translog function, we use maximum likelihood methods, which allow observation-specific estimates of technical efficiency to be obtained (Jondrow et al., 1982) . We constrain the efficiency term to be constant over time; it seems the most reasonable assumption given that the time-period we are analysing is quite short (i.e. four years); significant changes in the relative efficiency of universities are likely to occur more in the medium than in the short run, given that input levels and "production technology" must be changed accommodating the spaces for higher efficiency 7 .
Our Translog cost function is the following: 
Data
There is a long history in literature of efficiency studies in higher education (HE) and a long experience about the inputs and outputs that are being used in such analyses. In these studies, mainly two types of outputs are used: first of all, outputs that are related to the teaching activities of higher education; and, second, outputs that are related to research activities, such as publishing and applying for research grants. Furthermore, some studies use only teaching outputs (e.g. Abbott & Doucouliagos, 2009; Agasisti & Salerno, 2007; Stevens, 2005) Johnes, et al. (2005) and Worthington & Lee (2008) . Specifications of these different outputs are, for instance, scientific publications, number of undergraduate, graduate or PhD students, income from research, and income from grants. Studies that combine these two types of outputs often focus on the existence of economies of scope (e.g. De Witte, et al., 2012) . Some studies deviate from the standard outputs, as described above. These studies use, for example, quality and reputation of the higher education institutes as output (Dawson, et al., 2009) . With respect to inputs, there is also a large distinction between studies that include costs (e.g. Athanassopoulos & Shale, 1997; Johnes, 2006 Johnes, , 2008 Worthington & Lee, 2008) and studies that do not (e.g. Adams et al., 2005; Ferrari & Laureti, 2005) .
However, in general there is an agreement on using costs or expenditures as inputs and teaching (number of students or graduates) and/or research (grants) as outputs. Taking this into account, we use the total expenditures (corrected for inflation) as inputs. In line with the European common goal of increasing the number of higher education graduates we use the number of graduates as output, as well as research grants (corrected for inflation), which can be considered both an activity and performance 8 . Unfortunately, we do not have information on publications or citations and therefore cannot take these into account as an output. As a matter of comparison,
we also estimate a model in which we use number of students as an output, to show the differences between countries with different estimation models.
In the standard model that we consider (labelled 'Cost for performance'), we use the bachelor, master and PhD graduates and research grants as outputs. In the alternative model that we use for comparison we consider the number of bachelor and master students, as well as PhD candidates and also research grants as outputs.
Data were collected by Statistical agencies of the two countries, and refer to a Table 1 , for both countries separately. These statistics already give a lot of information about the differences between the two countries.
First of all, we see that there are large differences with respect to the average size of the universities. The average Dutch university is about two-thirds the size of an Italian university. The minimum and maximum values show that there is also a much larger variation in university size in Italy than in the Netherlands. The ratio between bachelor and master students is very similar in both countries; there are more than twice as many bachelor students than master students 9 . The average numbers of PhD candidates is also very similar in the two countries; although the minimum and maximum show that there are huge differences between universities within Italy.
Interestingly, the average number of staff is larger in the Netherlands compared with Italy, despite the lower student numbers. The number of staff per student is therefore much higher in the Netherlands. The same interesting differences can be seen with respect to the bachelor, master and PhD graduates. The expenditures and research grants are also much higher in the Netherlands than in Italy.
While the number of students was much higher in Italy, we see that the graduation rates are very similar for bachelor students and even higher for master and PhD students in the Netherlands. These numbers might already reflect the differences in policy and funding in the two countries (between-countries differences), as well as a different average level of universities' efficiency (within-country differences).
<Table 1> around here
Results
First, we discuss the results of the stochastic cost function analysis in which we analyse both countries together in one model. We compare the average efficiency of the universities of each country when using the 'cost for performance' policy view; the objective is to see what happens when comparing the performances of the universities operating in the two different countries assuming common incentives (i.e.
Italian universities are pursuing the same objectives of Dutch ones). After that, we present the results of analysing Italian and Dutch universities using separate empirical models, in which we show the different objectives between the universities operating in the two countries, as the efficiency of each university is computed with reference only to the group of universities operating in the same country. Lastly, we estimate the alternative model in which we use the number of students as output, to show that Italian universities perform better in the model that coincides with the incentives created by the funding scheme that is used in Italy. It is hard to image Italian universities as efficient given the high dropout rates. However, given the incentive to attract large student numbers, Italian universities are more efficient than Dutch one, albeit by a small amount.
Analysing countries together in the cost for performance model
Part A of Table 2 presents the results of the SFA cost function analysis, in which the Italian and Dutch universities are considered together in the same model 10 . This implies that we assume that the universities have similar incentives and similar cost minimizing behaviour. In order to correct for other differences, such as personnel salaries, between the countries we include a country dummy in our analysis. We also included time dummies (reference year: 2008/09); the negative signs associated with the relative estimated coefficients mean that expenditures are growing over time.
ln(sigma2) is also statistically significant, and indicates the presence of significant inefficiency, i.e. universities are not operating with a cost-minimizing behaviour, which also shows in the efficiency scores of part B of Table 2 . Part B of Table 2 shows the mean and the standard deviation of the efficiency of the universities per country, which are averages of all the universities for all years. These results underline the expectations that were presented in the theoretical framework, in other words that Dutch universities perform much better at the cost for performance model, which is in line with the incentives based on which money is distributed. In Table 2 we can also see that the incentives are different for It is important to underline here that, given the models' assumptions, it does not mean that Italian universities perform almost the same as Dutch ones. Actually, the results are driven by the hypothesis that universities minimize the costs for their performances; in this context, fewer resources available for Italian universities make them similarly "efficient", even though they actually "perform" worse. Indeed, the ratio of transformation of a student into a graduate is much higher for Dutch universities (the ratio "students to graduates" is 7:1 in Italy vs. 4:1 in the Netherlands). In other words, Italian universities are able to spend less money for any student or graduate than their Dutch counterparts, but the cost of transforming a student in a graduate is lower for the latter.
<Table 2 and Figure 3> around here
Analysing countries separately in the cost for performance model
Considering that we find a strong suggestion towards there being different policy views and thereby different incentives for Dutch and Italian universities, the question rises whether it is fair to compare the performance and efficiency of these universities simultaneously, using one model. As discussed before, this implies the assumption of similar incentives and similar economic behaviour. Since this is a questionable assumption, we decided to compare the average efficiency results per country in which the universities of the two countries are included separately. All the model specifications and used inputs and outputs are similar to before 11 . Table 3 presents the results; again time dummies are negative (expenditures are increasing over time) and ln(sigma2) is statistically significant (i.e. inefficiency in production must be assumed). Table 3 table underlines the main point of the paper: indeed, when considering the two countries separately (allowing for both betweencountries and within-country variation of universities' efficiency), the average efficiency score is much higher in the Netherlands than in Italy, and the difference is much more marked than that highlighted when considering the two countries together (see previous section). This means that, when analysing the two countries together, imposing the same "system of incentives" partially masks the Italian universities'
inefficiency. Thus, the evidence points at the fact that it might not be right to assume the same incentives and economic behaviour for these countries -that is, this evidence is coherent with the hypothesis formulated in Section 2. We also see that the average efficiency of Italian universities is somewhat higher when analysing countries separately, while there is a significant difference for the Netherlands. We consider it as a further piece of evidence about the necessity to acknowledge the different systems of incentives when empirically analysing the efficiency of the universities operating in two different countries, especially for those (in this case, the Dutch ones) which are explicitly focused on clear and challenging objectives (output-oriented funding model). As shown in the figure 4, which reports histograms for Italian and Dutch universities, when comparing with the model in which both countries were analysed together, the average efficiency score is higher in both countries, but Dutch institutions turn out to be relatively more efficient than Italian ones.
<Table 3 and Figure 4> around here To underline our case even further, we show the results of the cost per activity model in Table 4 . In Table 4 we see that Italian universities are much more efficient than their Dutch counterparts, when we use number of bachelor and master students as outputs instead of graduates. This shows once again that the incentives in Italy are not towards producing graduates, but towards accepting as many students as possible, which is very inefficient from a European point of view, in which an increase in the number of graduates is valued much more.
<Table 4 > around here
Concluding Remarks and Discussion
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